Minutes

Monday 9 September 2019

Meeting title/subject: Flight Operations & Safety Committee

Meeting location: ATC Tower, Edinburgh Airport

Attendees:

[redacted] – Chair	Edinburgh Airport
[redacted] – Notes	Edinburgh Airport
[redacted]	Edinburgh Airport
[redacted]	ANS
[redacted]	ANS
[redacted]	NATS
[redacted]	Jet2
[redacted]	Jet2
[redacted]	easyJet
[redacted]	WFS
[redacted]	Ryanair
[redacted]	British Airways
[redacted]	Loganair

Description	Action
1. Actions from Previous Meeting • Mobile numbers to be sent to [redacted] for creation of FLOPSC WhatsApp group. • Stands 317/317A (full code C) are open and charts will be published in October. The space at the end of this area is likely to be for GA. Still awaiting SEPA approval to de-ice on these stands/Turnhouse Apron and the feeling is it is unlikely it will be in place for this winter. • Jet2 highlighted an issue around the visibility of the yellow centrelines on the Turnhouse Apron, particularly during wet conditions. No issues reported since the last meeting. SM advised the group to continue to report any issues. • Loganair were advised that Airside Quarterback team endeavour to consolidate aircraft where possible to allow for more efficient handling. Airside Stand Planning Standard is attached to the minutes for information.	ALL
2. Noise/CDA/Environment • EAL are working with Casper (the NTK supplier) to refine the CDA model. Data will be available in a couple of weeks.	
3. DVOR Rationalisation • [redacted] presented on the DVOR Rationalisation project that is underway by NATS. The project will see the removal of en-route dependencies relating to the TRN and GOW DVOR's.	
• **ATC Incidents** • June and July seen go around instruction from ATC higher than flight crew requests. Issue discussed around who makes decision whether to depart if previous landing/departing aircraft had reported a birdstrike. Group advised they would always err on the side of safety and if they didn't have the exact information, they wouldn't go. Decision made following discussion that ATC will make the call to mitigate any uncertainty. • Couple of CTA infringements – aircraft on finals and helicopters in vicinity.	

Description	Action
• Jet2 vacated at Bravo to discover there were barriers in place, ATC error. Breakdown in communication, contractors finished work in the area however ATC were not told it was back in service. • Vueling aircraft A320 cut corner at 15B, emergency stop activated by [redacted]. Aircraft was stationery in the grass and towed out. SM advised fillet works will go ahead ASAP. More work than first anticipated, 5 weeks work, Lima taxiway will be closed throughout and whole of Stand 15 area will need to be closed off. Options for doing it on nightshift are being looked at. SM advised that the stand area and route into it are all fully compliant. The group asked if it would be best to route all aircraft through [redacted] in the interim to mitigate it happening again. **ATC will chat with operators to determine best course of action and [redacted] will speak to [redacted]** • CTA Infringement – 1 • Controlled Error – 1, Vista Jet • Loss of separation with Cityflyer inbound and Stobart outbound. PIK controller handed to EDI controller too soon without coordinating separation distance. • Controlled airspace infringement, C130 flew through the hold. • Golf 3 may change when Hotel becomes a code E compliant taxiway • Incorrect taxi route – 4 July, 4 August • Pushback errors – 2 July, 0 August	[redacted]
4. LRST (Local Runway Safety Team) • [redacted] asked if anyone attended these meetings at other airports as EDI are getting poor attendance. EASA guidance material is attached to the minutes. [redacted] proposes to ask CAA if he can include the LRST as an agenda item on the FLOPSC going forward. All to review guidance and feedback any opinions to SM.	[redacted]
5. Runway/Ramp Safety • [redacted] advised there has been an increase in flight crew entering stands without guidance being activated or marshaller indicating to proceed - 12 incidents in the last 2 months alone. [redacted] advised a warning box is going to be added to the docking and parking charts reminding crews to hold off stand until guidance illuminated or marshaller has indicated to proceed. • Failure to give way on the increase, mixture of experience and areas on the airfield. Investigation process does include an interview with the drivers and it is highlighted at monthly MRG's. Despite safety campaigns, notices on vehicles, signage on doors at posts etc numbers are still high • Wildlife – 24 reports over July/August. 16 confirmed 7 of which were migratory species (house martins, sand martins, swallows etc) peregrine falcon struck by a/c. 63 culled over the 2 months; herring gulls, rooks etc. Grass condition is challenging, yet to be topped however difficult due to recent wet weather. Insecticide – soil samples came back with no grubs or larvae therefore none has been applied this year.	
6. AOB • [redacted] advised more surface breakups due to high rainfall. Delta 1, middle of runway. Runway inspection was carried out on 28 Aug with plan to carry out repairs over 4 weekends in November. [redacted] will share the dates as soon as its been confirmed. Full runway rehab in next 2-3 years, and will start planning now. Looking at links Alpha, Bravo, Charlie Delta – Bravo and Charlie will be first for repair, port side at Bravo is patchy.	[redacted]

Description	Action
• Civil Engineering teams done inspection on A8 to A18 with multiple repairs being undertaken. Tactical repairs (urgent) will change departure points and marshal past areas until set, Ops will work with ATC to determine best course of action. • [redacted] asked if the chair could encourage HA's to be present at future meetings. [redacted] will look at rejuvenating and ask them to attend. MS advised he seen one of the ramp agents on his phone while being back of stand roadman, and lots of FOD present at stand 14 one day. [redacted] asked [redacted] to keep him informed of such incidents so he can speak directly to the handling agent. • [redacted] expressed concern about the impending changes to Staff Parking – the group don't feel they were consulted. Concern around processing of crews through post 4, timebound pressures etc. Not much consultation seems to be have been done. Interim advice to group is to feed back to EAL Airline Account Manager, however project lead ([redacted] will be back to present at the next meeting.	[redacted]
7. Date of Next Meeting • Next meeting will take place on Monday 11 November, 1330hrs in the ATC Conference Room.	

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Stand Planning Standards

1.0 Priorities and Guiding Factors

1.1 There are a number of priorities and guiding factors to consider, to deliver optimum utilisation of aircraft Stands at Edinburgh Airport;

- Provision of a safe operation
- Facilitating on time performance (OTP)
- Delivering the best possible service to our passengers whilst achieving high levels of customer satisfaction, including a reduction in complaints
- Achieving maximum pier service level (PSL) at all times without compromising safety or OTP
- Minimising ground movement delays
- Maximising communication between Airside Operations and the Ground Handling Agents regarding hold for stand to achieve optimum levels of on time performance

1.2 Aircraft with the highest capacity of passengers, as filed with ACL, should be allocated Contact Stands in the first instance.

1.3 Coaching requirements to be kept to a minimum

- Towing to be executed to reduce coaching requirements as outlined in the Tow Plan

1.4 Frequency and seasonality of service

- Airlines operating year-round to be given consideration over seasonal airlines
- Services operating at a greater frequency should be prioritised ahead of those with lower frequency

1.5 Airline preference

- Airlines do not have their own dedicated Stands
- An airline may state where they prefer to operate from, e.g. from one particular Stand or area of the airport, however, sections 1.1 – 1.4 will always be considered ahead of any preference(s)

2.0 Stand Planning Process – seasonal planning

2.1 Once the slot hand back process has been completed and a first draft of the schedule has been received from ACL, a week plan from Monday to Sunday will be completed for the peak week of the season. The respective peak week for each organisation will differ however upon identification each party will inter-share this information to allow effective planning and service delivery.

2.2 The Stand Plan, along with a Tow Plan and Night Stop Plan will be issued to the airline community for consideration. A consultation meeting will be convened, where feedback will be taken and any changes, which can be honoured, will be made and a revised plan finalised and issued.

3.0 Stand Planning Process – operational planning

3.1 A Stand Plan, along with a Tow Plan and Night Stop Plan will be issued to the airline community for feedback.

3.2 The first draft will be circulated six weeks in advance.

3.3 Feedback will be provided five weeks in advance.

3.4 A finalised plan will be issued four weeks in advance, which will reflect any changes agreed from the feedback received.

3.5 The Stand Plan will always be flexible, to allow cognisance to be taken of any impacting factors, e.g. project work, airline schedule changes, varying sizes of aircraft, responses to emergencies.

4.0 Daily Operation

4.1 To maximise Stand planning, towing, coaching and overall performance aircraft registrations should be input to Chroma prior to the arrival of the night stopping aircraft. This would allow for the appropriate Stand allocation of night stopping aircraft, reduce unnecessary towing and coaching, thus supporting maximum OTP achievement in the following day's operation, particularly the First Wave.

4.2 It is imperative for effective Stand allocation, Chroma is kept up to date for both arriving and departing flights in relation to their ETA and ETD. Delays of any nature must be entered to Chroma as soon as they are known to allow for reallocations to be made if necessary, and the resulting impact of changes kept to a minimum.

4.3 Stand changes will normally only be communicated via Chroma. It is the responsibility of the airline/handling agent to use Chroma for information on Stand changes/holds, etc.

4.3.1 Where circumstances dictate, communication between Airside Operations staff and Ground Handling Agents can occur out with normal practice, where it is in the best interest of the delivery of the operation.

4.4 A minimum of ten minutes is facilitated between flights allocated the same Stand, if allocated Stands 1B to 25. If less than ten minutes is available, the flight will then be allocated an alternative Stand which may be remote. If an airline is prepared to wait for a contact Stand when the gap is less than the above, and holding space is available, this can be accommodated upon request.

4.5 Push and hold procedures will be utilised whenever available and required, subject to ATC approval.

4.6 Should aircraft arrive in advance of their STA and their allocated Stand is occupied by an aircraft running to schedule, they will be given the option of an alternative Stand or hold for their allocated Stand, the latter being subject to ATC approval. Aircraft arriving after their STA may not be allocated their planned Stand if that allocation causes consequential disruption to Stand allocation for other aircraft.

4.7 Contact Stand occupancy exceeding the maximum stay on Stand timeframes may render aircraft liable to being towed to a remote Stand unless operationally viable; timings as shown in Appendix A.

4.8 Where operational information or lack of remedial action is not supplied or undertaken by an Airline or GHA, that Airline may be allocated a remote stand on its next operation.

4.9 Off schedule aircraft are defined as movements out with the +/- 15 minutes from scheduled arrival or departure time.

4.10 Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, Stand Plan flexibility as per 3.5 will apply.

5.0 Towing Standards

5.1 The GHA will be advised only once of required tow movements before first wave departures each morning.

5.2 It is the expectation that the tow movement will be executed within the agreed time scale. If, for whatever reason, the tow cannot be executed, it is the responsibility of the handling agent to advise Airside Operations in the first instance.

5.3 Airside Operations should be informed immediately of any aircraft experiencing technical faults which may impact the departure time of the flight. If the fault is expected to take longer than 90 minutes to rectify, then the aircraft should be safely repositioned to a remote Stand to allow for maintenance to continue; timings as shown in Appendix A.

5.4 There may be occasions whereby it is not possible to move the aircraft depending upon the nature of the fault. Airside Operations should be made aware of this and alternative, safe solutions will be sought.

5.5 In extreme instances whereby an aircraft fault cannot be fixed within the aforementioned 90 minutes, airline/handling agent management must liaise with the Airside Operations Duty Manager as soon as possible to agree an alternative time for repositioning the aircraft. There is, however, no guarantee that the aircraft can be accommodated beyond the 90 minutes and this clause must only be used in exceptional circumstances and not become the norm.

6.0 Airside Coaching

6.1 Aircraft planned to park on remote Stands, will automatically be allocated coaches to service the arrival and departure, as will aircraft whose origin dictates that they cannot disembark directly into the terminal, e.g. Madrid arrival on Stand eight or Dublin arrival on Stand 24.

6.2 The number of coaches will be deployed depending upon the actual number of passengers on the aircraft.

6.2.1 To allow for the appropriate allocation of the requisite number of coaches it is imperative that the GHAs input accurate passenger numbers into Chroma Fusion.

6.3 The coach(es) will be on stand in sufficient time for the first disembarking passenger of arriving aircraft.

6.4 Last minute coaching requests resulting from issues such as the result of a Stand change or corridor conflict will be responded to as soon as resource is available. It is the responsibility of the Airline/GHA to arrange such coaching requests directly with the Airside Support Unit.

Appendix A

Table 1. Timings (in minutes) by aircraft type

Aircraft type	Deplane / Offload [min]	Tow off [min]	Tow back [min]	On stand STD T- [min]	*Max stay on stand [min]
Code B; D38, S340, S2000	15	15	15	40	115
Code C; DH4, E90, AR1	20	15	15	50	130
Code C; A319, A320, A321, B737	30	15	15	60	150
Code D; 757, 767	45	15	15	75	195
Code E; 787	60	15	15	90	225

*Unless operationally viable

GM2 ADR.OR.D.027 Safety programmes

ED Decision 2014/012/R

LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAM

(a) Context

As part of its runway safety programme, the aerodrome operator should establish and lead a Local Runway Safety Team and act on local runway safety issues, including runway incursion (including runway confusion) and excursion prevention.

A runway incursion is defined as 'Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft1.'

1 The 'protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft' is to be interpreted as the physical surface of a runway, from the centreline to the holding point appropriate to the type of runway. Where operations are being conducted during low visibility operations this should be the holding point appropriate to the procedures in force. The 'protected surface' includes the ILS glide-path and localiser critical areas at all times, and the ILS sensitive areas during low visibility procedures.

A runway excursion occurs when 'An aircraft veers off or overruns the runway surface during either take-off or landing'.

(b) Local Runway Safety Team composition

Participation should include representatives from all interested parties with direct involvement in runway operations at the aerodrome, including, but is not limited, to:

(1) aerodrome operations;

(2) aerodrome engineering and maintenance;

(3) air navigation service providers;

(4) aircraft operators that operate of the aerodrome;

(5) aerodrome rescue and firefighting services;

(6) drivers having access on the manoeuvring area.

(c) Role

The role of the Local Runway Safety Team should be to advise the appropriate management on potential runway safety issues, and to recommend mitigating measures.

(d) Tasks

The Local Runway Safety Team may have the following tasks:

(1) identification of potential runway safety issues, including the need for establishment of hot spots or other problem areas at the aerodrome and the review of the relevant entries of the AIP for accuracy;

(2) developing and running local awareness campaigns, at suitable periods, including at the start of a busy season or before an unusual event, that focus on local issues, for example, producing and distributing local hot spot maps, or other guidance material considered as necessary; local awareness campaigns should be periodically refreshed to maintain interest and operational awareness of the relevant personnel;

(3) monitoring the number, type and, the severity of runway incursions; disseminating safety recommendations delivered from accident and incident investigation findings as well as other relevant lessons learned e.g. from operational experience and best risk mitigation practices; sharing good practices to prevent runway incursions or excursions;

(4) assisting in verifying that communications between air traffic controllers, or other Air Traffic Services personnel, pilots, and vehicle drivers are satisfactory, or if any improvements could be suggested;

(5) making observations on a regular basis in different weather and light conditions to assess whether all runway entrances and visual aids are adequate, correctly located and understandable by all parties concerned, with no possible ambiguity of their meaning, or identify potential aerodrome design issues;

(6) understanding the operating difficulties of personnel working in other areas, and recommending areas for improvement; when reviewing operating procedures, it is necessary to ensure that the procedures employed by different companies at the aerodrome are integrated and effective, so as to minimise the risk of runway incursions. Care should be taken when examining existing or proposed runway capacity enhancing procedures or noise abatement schemes involving runway preferential systems;

(7) development of joint, initial and recurrent, training programmes and familiarisation on runway incursion and excursion prevention, for all relevant personnel (vehicle drivers and other personnel operating on the manoeuvring area, pilots, Air Traffic Services personnel); this may include visits to the manoeuvring area to increase awareness of the aerodrome layout, markings, signs, position of anemometers etc., where this is considered necessary;

(8) providing advice prior to the implementation of changes to the aerodrome, practices and procedures to identify potential for runway incursion or excursion; and

(9) assessing the effectiveness of implemented operational solutions periodically.