

# Stage 2 Clarification Questions for ACP-2020-043 // ACP-2020-044 // ACP-2020-045



#	Submission Document Name, Page/Para	Question/Issue	Tech/Conslt/ Env/Econ/ ATM/IFP/ General	Response Date	Response
1	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 1.5.2	<p>What is a benefit in Safety?</p> <p>Does this mean that the current system is not safe? The IOA, for the Hybrid Systemised option states 'enhance safety assurance'; does this mean risk is being reduced?</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; paragraph 1.5.2 reworded to state "maintain or improve the high safety standards and provide environmental and capacity benefits".</p> <p>Current system is safe. It would reduce risk as it would go from 'safe' to 'safer' – in the context of forecast increased traffic loading the reduction of tactical intervention should increase safety.</p>
2	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 2.11.1	<p>Does systemisation reduce human interventions or tactical interventions?</p> <p>What is/are the difference(s)?</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; paragraph 2.11.1 reworded to "tactical intervention" for consistency.</p> <p>No difference between "human intervention" or "tactical intervention".</p>
3	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 3.5	<p>Please can you provide further details on, what is meant by 'exceptionally challenging' and 'challenging' with regard to the structures referred to.</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; paragraph 3.5.3 expanded as follows:</p> <p>Exceptionally challenging "...due to the type and level of activity that currently operate in this area. For example, Danger Areas, or specific military requirements at certain military airfields".</p> <p>Challenging areas "...as these are military training areas outside CAS".</p>
4	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 3.8.4	<p>Given that in para 3.8.2 it is stated that '...we have not determined the extent of any CAS changes...' but only relevant for volumes not associated with an airport, and in para 3.8.3 it is stated that, 'The release of CAS will only be considered where there is existing Class G</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; paragraph 3.8.3 reworded as follows:</p> <p>"NERL anticipates that the release of airspace, under this condition, could have a negligible impact on the</p>

		<p>airspace available for GA traffic to currently use below CAS'.</p> <p>How can it be considered, at this juncture, that it will have a negligible impact on the number of aircraft using the airspace, given that the full extent of CAS changes are yet to be determined?</p> <p>Is the reclassification of airspace to G always going to 'deliver positive impact to our stakeholders'?</p>			<p>number of aircraft using the airspace. Any release of CAS will likely deliver positive impact to our stakeholders by providing a greater volume of airspace for GA traffic to fly within. This could also lead to a potential reduction in the noise impact for stakeholders on the ground as aircraft will be able to elect to fly at a higher altitude. This will be fully assessed during Stage 3."</p>
5	<p>Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 4.1.14/18/20</p>	<p>Table 16 - Feedback from Lufthansa LIDO appears to refer to Highly Systemised Design?</p> <p>Table 18 - Feedback from Lufthansa LIDO appears to refer to Do Minimum Design?</p> <p>Table 19 - Feedback from Lufthansa LIDO appears to refer to Do Minimum Design?</p>	General	May 2023	<p>No change to document.</p> <p>LIDO's responses were the same for Options 1 &amp; 2, and for Options 3, 4 and 5 and have been correctly referenced in the documentation set.</p>
6	<p>Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 4.2</p>	<p>In the DPE assessment under DP9 (PBN standard). How can a PBN standard 'decrease safety'?</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master and all airport documents updated; Table 20 (paragraph 4.2.1) Master; Table 8 (paragraph 3.4.1) Airport; Table 2 (paragraph 3.4.1) Manston.</p> <p>DP Criteria updated to read: "PBN standard applied to route spacing would maintain or decrease efficiency and maintain safety".</p> <p>PBN standard would not decrease safety.</p>
7	<p>Stage 2 PM DPEs.</p>	<p>Southend uses the statement: 'PM are used elsewhere today and known to be safe' and others PM assessment (Northolt) state that DP0 is enhanced due to reduced controller workload, Stansted: 'PM are used in current day operations and are known to be safe. In this location, increased ATCO workload.' (See Q9 below)</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Southend document updated; Table 11 (paragraph 3.4.4) to change wording of the Point Merge Safety DPEs to match Stansted's.</p> <p>For Southend, PM would increase ATCO workload compared to the baseline but would remain safe, therefore original wording correct. Stansted have "Maintains: PM are used in today's operation and are known to be safe. In this location, increased ATCO workload". For consistency, this has been applied to Southend.</p> <p>For Northolt it would reduce workload compared to the baseline, therefore enhancing safety. This wording is not relevant to Southend's situation.</p>

8	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 9.2.3	<p>If the ATM system is currently safe due to the work controllers do, is a high workload environment a negative aspect of today's operation which creates risk?</p> <p>The IOA on page 40 says that it is the potential increase in traffic forecast, that would increase controller workload. The IOA page 41 says that a hybrid system should reduce the potential for human error, yet there will still be some tactical intervention. If the new design will reduce the risk of controller/pilot error by reducing workload, will it create other risks or is just a high workload (controller capacity) that is the risk being mitigated?</p> <p>The baseline IOAs are clear that it is flow management that will be applied to maintain safety, potentially resulting in delays.</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; paragraph 2.2.6 expanded as follows:</p> <p>“... Even in a systemised environment tactical intervention will occur, although to a lesser extent than the ‘Do Nothing’ Baseline. This mitigates an increase in tactical intervention and cognitive impairment which would be a by-product of increase traffic if the baseline remained”.</p> <p>Yes, a high workload environment is a negative aspect of today's operation which is why we're trying to reduce workload. As per the forecast, traffic demand is growing so capacity will become a risk. We are mitigating an increase in tactical intervention and cognitive impairment (e.g. RT loading), which would be a by-product of increased traffic if nothing was done.</p>
9	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Biggin, Farnborough, Gatwick, Bournemouth, London City, Southend, Southampton	<p>DP0 provides ATCO control-ability as a consideration. DP8, provides ATCO workload as a consideration. Is control-ability concerned with the design and the ability of the controller to do their job?</p> <p>Is workload concerned with the increase in quantity and consequential complexity?</p> <p>If DP0 can get a 'met' yet DP8 can get a 'not-met' what is providing the mitigation to the sub-optimal option that allows for safety to maintained when workload is increased?</p> <p>Stanstead AA-PM-OH provides a caveat under DP0 'in this case location increased ATCO workload'.</p> <p>Bournemouth cites bigger operating range increases workload.</p> <p>Farnborough IH-SW DP8 appears to contradict itself?</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Farnborough document updated; Table 11 (paragraph 3.4.4) wording and RAG colour of DP8 (Capacity) corrected to align with wording of DP8 (Efficiency), DP10 (AMS) also updated, but no change to RAG colour.</p> <p>For Safety (DP0) ATCO control-ability is a factor in the assessment. Whereas, in DP8 (Efficiency) ATCO workload what is being assessed. Depending on other factors and potential mitigations, ATCO workload (DP8 Efficiency) could remain similar to today (amber) or increase (red) whilst overall safety is still at least maintained (green). Therefore, no change in documentation for clarification.</p>
10	Figure 1 for EGLL, Figure 1 for EGGW and Figure 3 Master Document	<p>Figure 1 for EGLL and EGGW do not appear to align with the Figure 3 in the master document? ie CPT hold and SIRIC 1N STAR.</p>	Technical	May 2023	<p>Master document updated; Table 9 (paragraph 3.3.2) to reference SIRIC and title date updated.</p> <p>Biggin Hill, Gatwick, Heathrow, London City, Luton and Stansted documents updated; Table 2 (paragraph 2.1.3) to reference SIRIC.</p>

					<p>Luton and Stansted documents updated; Figure 1 (paragraph 2.1.4) updated to show SIRIC.</p> <p>Master document updated; Table 10 (paragraph 3.4.1) to reference RODNI SID and associated ATS routes.</p> <p>Luton document updated; Table 3 (paragraph 2.1.4) to reference RODNI SID and associated ATS routes.</p> <p>There is no terminal holding facility at CPT, therefore not shown on any map. Therefore, no change to documents regarding this point.</p>
11	Engagement Pack	In the example engagement pack, there is an email to all stakeholders dated 3 October 2022 that has an FAQ document attached. As far as I can see, a copy of that FAQ document has not been provided as part of the submission. Could we have a copy please?	Engagement / Consultation	May 2023	Copy provided to CAA.
12	Stage 2 Develop and Assess Master Document Para – 2.3.2	Document states 'Stakeholders were sent reminder emails: two weeks into the response period; with one week to go, and on the final day, if they hadn't responded'. The example engagement pack only include a copy of one reminder email, dated 17 October 2022. Can we have evidence of the other reminder emails being referred to please?	Engagement / Consultation	May 2023	Copy provided to CAA.