MINUTES OF LONDON OXFORD AIRPORT - INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES - RWY01 AND RWY19 (ACP-2023-033) ASSESSMENT MEETING HELD AT AVIATION HOUSE GATWICK AND BY TEAMS ON 2 NOVEMBER 2023

9 November 2023

All Attendees and Apologies

Present	Appointment	Representing
[redacted]	Managing Director/Accountable Manager	London Oxford Airport
[redacted]	Head of Air Traffic Services / Sec	London Oxford Airport
[redacted]	Operations Director	London Oxford Airport
[redacted]	Director, Merlin Aerospace Consulting Ltd	London Oxford Airport
[redacted]	Airspace Regulator (Environment)	CAA
[redacted]	Airspace Regulator (Economist)	CAA
[redacted]	ATS Inspector (Operations)	CAA
[redacted]	Airspace Regulator (Engagement & Consultation)	CAA
[redacted]	Airspace Regulator (Technical)	CAA
[redacted]	Airspace Regulator (Engagement & Consultation)	CAA
[redacted]	Airspace Change Account Manager	CAA

Apologies

Apologies were received from:

[redacted]	IFP Airspace Regulator	CAA

CAA Assessment Meeting Opening Statement

CAA noted that the Statement of Need (SON), the Agenda, and the Power Point presentation were received in advance of the Assessment Meeting and confirmed that the SON and Agenda had been published on the Airspace Portal. The minutes of the Assessment Meeting and the Power Point presentations slide pack must be published by the sponsor on the Airspace Change Portal page. CAA explained the purpose of the meeting and confirmed that the meeting was an Assessment Meeting and not a Gateway. The CAA reinforced that the sponsor was required to provide a broad description of their proposed approach to meeting the CAA's CAP 1616 requirements, but the CAA was not deciding whether the proposed approach met the detailed requirements of the CAA's process at this stage. The purpose of the Assessment Meeting (set out in detail in CAP 1616) was broadly:

- for the Sponsor to present and discuss their Statement of Need,
- to enable the CAA to consider whether the proposal concerned falls within the scope of the formal airspace change process, including determining whether the proposal falls within the scope of a scaled CAP 1616 ACP for the introduction of RNP Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) without an Approach Control as described in CAP 1961,
- to enable the CAA to consider the appropriate provisional Level to assign to the change proposal.

Additionally, the sponsor was required to provide information on how it intended to proceed to fulfil the requirements of the airspace change process and to provide information on timescales. Lastly, the sponsor was required to provide information on how it intended to meet the engagement requirements of the various stages of the airspace change process.

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Item 1 – Introduction [redacted] opened the meeting, welcomed the participants to the Assessment Meeting and invited introductions from the participants. [redacted] then read out a prepared statement, reproduced above, finishing by handing over to London Oxford Airport (LOA) to present the Statement of Need under Item 2.	

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Item 2 – Statement of Need (discussion and review) The original Statement of Need (SON) Versions 1 had been uploaded onto the CAA Portal by LOA on 11 May 2023. Version 2 was uploaded on 19 June 2023 following a request by the CAA for more detailed information. Following a change in the management team, the Airspace Change proposal (ACP) was paused, and the original planned Assessment Meeting cancelled as time was required to reflect on how to proceed. It was considered that Version 2 of the SON was too detailed as some of the proposed infrastructure might not be required by stakeholders who had not yet been consulted; the actual requirement would be refined during the CAP1616 process. The ACP was restarted on 20 September 2023 and a Confirmation Statement uploaded onto the Airspace Portal; Version 3 of the SON was uploaded on 21 September 2023 and a new date for the Assessment Meeting agreed as 2 November 2023. [redacted] described what LOA was looking to achieve, namely a 3D instrument recovery to runway (RWY) 01 which was currently not provided. RWY01 only has an NDB; however, the problem with the NDB was that modern aircraft were not fitted with ADF and crews were not familiar with flying this type of procedure. The airport was also looking to provide Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures as ICAO has mandated PBN instrument procedures to each instrument runway end by 2024. [redacted] posed a question about the appropriate level of airspace to contain the IAPs? Was Class G acceptable as it was today, which meets current requirement of UK FIS and was 'as low as reasonably practicable' or was containment of the IAPs required which would provide an increased level of safety? The CAA and LOA team discussed the SON and some changes were suggested to it to ensure that all the reasons that were driving the change were included to better reflect the requirement, rather than waiting until the DEFINE Gateway. [redacted] raised a point linked to CAP1616, Paragraph 102, which details some examples of particular issues or opportunities where an airspace change might be an appropriate response. [redacted] suggested emphasising the important drivers for change and clarifying in the SON what happens today and then include some major headings as underpinnings for the ACP such as improving airspace efficiency or capacity, responding to safety incidents, a change in legislation, and improving access to airspace. This suggestion was welcomed by the sponsor and would be included in a Version 4 of the SON. [redacted] went on to query whether paragraph 5 added anything to the SON? [redacted] asked the CAA whether there was a future requirement for Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operations to be contained within controlled airspace (CAS) or not under the Airspace Modernisation Strategy (AMS) within which there was a driver to align more closely with ICAO? [redacted] explained that he felt it was for the CAA to respond about CAT and CAS as should it be required, it could become a key driver for the ACP. At this stage there was no clear answer as CAT was currently operating within Class G, this discussion would form part of the process. [redacted] added that looking at the AMS, Aerodrome Traffic Zones (ATZ) would disappear under ICAO rules. Part of the engagement with stakeholders would look at options. It makes sense to plan for the AMS now to avoid having to revisit the question at some stage in the future. The SON would be updated and published on the CAA Portal as Version 4.	[redacted] to amend SON and publish
Item 3 – Issues or opportunities arising from proposed change [redacted] described the Power Point presentation slides relevant to the agenda item. He reminded the meeting that Oxford Airport had previously submitted an ACP under CAP725 in 2015; this ACP had not been accepted by the CAA in February 2021. Since that time there had	

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been many changes at Oxford including a new Management team; an increase in overall traffic and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Business movements, particularly over the last four years, see Power Point Slides 7, 8 and 9; an increased number of conflicts in Class G airspace; and the airport has grown with infrastructure developments including a full length taxiway to RWY19, new business jet hangarage with more planned, a new Fire Station with permanent Rescue and Fire Fighting Category CAT 6, a self-serve AVGAS facility, a significant increase in Jet A1 capacity, an intent to drive more Business Traffic, planned expansion of radar hours from the current 08:00-18:00, a new Airbus Helicopter facility (under development to be operational late summer 2024), expressions of interest from Operators to operate regional transport links, and Oxford County Council's plan for an integrated Transport Hub to be located on the western side of the airport. The question posed was whether the current IAPs and airspace was appropriate to handle these changes? Whilst Business Aviation numbers were increasing, flying training movements would be fewer as one of the main flying training units based at Oxford had moved aircraft to a fair-weather base in mainland Europe. This together with the poor weather earlier in the year would reduce overall movements to similar levels to 2021. All of the above drive improvements at the airport and, therefore, we must look at whether LOA has the right facilities and airspace to safely contain not only traffic in and out of Oxford but transiting the area. **Issues** Issues included potential policy changes during the ACP process (there would already be changes required due to the updated CAP1616 from January 2024), the challenge of General Aviation (GA), particularly recreational and gliding, lack of Instrument Approach resilience in the event of a failure of the RWY19 ILS and/or NDB approaches, lack of a 3D approach to RWY01, the number of newer modern aircraft no longer fitted with an ADF, unable to fly an NDB approach, the impact of the AMS with the meaning of ICAO Flight Information Service (FIS) and the replacement of the ATZ potentially with a Radio Mandatory Zone (RMZ), and what these planned changes under the AMS would mean for the future, and the potential impact of the RAF Brize Norton ACP. It was recognised that Oxford would need to work closely with RAF Brize Norton in the development of its ACP. **Opportunities** The opportunities were to assist to deliver airspace modernisation, that requires PBN approaches, as part of the AMS; ability to enhance safety for all airspace users by providing accurate defined routes, possibly within Regulated airspace; opportunity to improve flight efficiency & environmental performance including noise and CO2; bring benefits to the ATC operation and to other airspace users in the region; and increase resilience through a greater number of IAPs. Commercial and compliance issues were discussed, see Slide 10, and Enhanced Flight Safety for all operators, see Slide 11. There was a CAA requirement to meet PBN regulations IR 2018/1048 "*Instrument runway ends currently served by only non-precision approach procedures will, in accordance with Part-AUR.PBN.2005 (1), require '3D approaches' at all Instrument Runway Ends (IREs) through deployment of LNAV, LNAV/VNAV and LPV lines of minima, and Radius to Fix (RF) where required.*" If this regulation was to be met, airspace change was required. The current ATZ does not accommodate all aircraft flying within the visual circuit and unknown aircraft, both transponding and non-transponding, frequently fly through the 'gap' between the edge of the ATZ and D129, crossing the instrument approach feathers or even flying along the feathers without speaking to Oxford. This creates safety concerns for pilots and controllers for aircraft established on a stabilised approach that must be warned about and/or broken off from their approach increasing the time that an aircraft was flying within Class G with the consequential additional environmental impact. The CAA made the point that in addition to transponding aircraft shown on Slide 12, there was an issue noted in several safety reports of non-transponding aircraft that must be avoided or gliders that often do not display on modern digital radars when flying slowly and/or were thermalling; these should be considered during the process.	

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The airport believed that the current operation was ALARP under the present Regulations but would look to increase safety further where possible. It was noted that that many private and recreational GA pilots were reluctant to contact ANSPs and there appeared to be an increasing number of them who were ignoring IAPs and the feathers marked on charts and flying through or even along the approach paths.	
Item 4 – Options to exploit opportunities or address issues identified The main options to exploit opportunities or address issues identified were detailed within Slide 13; this was all about improving safety for all users, reducing the environmental impact, providing a more efficient service, building better relationships with stakeholders, aligning the Brize Norton and Oxford ACPs, encouraging the GA community to use the air traffic services, and design GA Visual Flight Rules (VFR) routes to avoid local population where feasible. It was noted that the high number of controller interventions to avoid both unknown and known traffic, particularly during medium to high traffic periods, increased the track miles flown with the consequential increase in environmental CO2 and noise and the time an aircraft was within Class G. Controllers need to vector and sequence IFR traffic inbound and outbound both against other IFR and VFR to/from the airport to ensure safety of the landing/departing aircraft and/or the impact of wake turbulence, and against transit traffic both in contact with Oxford, on a listening squawk, and those working other Units or not speaking to anyone. Oxford traffic was approximately split 70%/30%[1] in favour of RWY19, when RWY01 was in use there was some protection afforded to arrivals by the Brize CAS. Whilst the Airport considers the current Class G operation to be ALARP due to the provision of UK FIS with TS and DS, and the ATZ, the Airport would seek to increase the level of safety where it could. [redacted] turned to the issues and opportunities facing LOA which are: • Potential Policy Changes during the process to CAP1616 including Wildlife Habitats could be challenging. • General Aviation (GA) particularly recreational aviation and gliding. • Lack of IAP resilience in the event of a failure of RWY19 ILS/NDB • Lack of a 3D approach to runway 01 means when there was a tailwind on RWY19, non-ADF equipped aircraft have no means to land in bad weather. • Impact of CAP1711 AMS. Parts 1 & 2 but Part 3 not yet published. Questions surround the interpretation of ICAO FIS and the removal of the ATZ. • ACP coordination with other sponsors such as RAF Brize Norton (with which Oxford was already engaged). • Opportunity exists to assist AMS which requires PBN approaches. • The ability to enhance safety for all airspace users by providing accurately defined routes, possibly within regulated airspace. • Reduce LOA's noise impact by potentially putting in routes which avoid population points which we couldnot currently achieve as we must move a/c around to avoid known and unknown traffic. • Exploit opportunity to improve flight efficiency and environmental performance. • Bring benefits to the ATC operation and to other airspace users in the region. • Increase resilience through a greater number of IAPs. [redacted] presented data showing the increases in activity levels from 2019 over lockdown and up to date showing strong growth across all sectors. [redacted] also mentioned that LOA wants to align airspace and operational precedents set by other airports with busy IFR traffic as Air Operator Certificate (AOC) holders have expectations of a Farnborough-type service. One of the issues was that there were foreign crews, and even some GA pilots, operating within the airspace with little understanding what a UK FIS was and their responsibilities.	

[1] Data from 1 January 2012 to 30 September 2023 showed 72% RWY19 and 28% RWY01 (from 1 January 2023 to 30 September 2023 the split was 64% RWY19 / 36% RWY01 owing to more frequent north-easterly winds).

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Slide 14 of the Slide Pack addressed possible options to be considered, these continued onto Slide 15 with consideration of an RMZ/TMZ. The statement made on the slide “This does not constitute a known traffic environment” was clarified as whereas an RMZ was a known traffic environment in that aircraft were to be in communication with the ANSP such that their intentions should be known but couldnot be ‘controlled’ to increase safety where a pilot elects not to comply with an ATC request; a TMZ was a recognised traffic environment where all traffic was transponding but the intentions were not known unless the pilot elects to communicate with ATC or the TMZ was part of an RMZ.	
Item 5 – Provisional indication of the scale level and process requirements* The CAA representatives indicated some of the process requirements for the ACP. **Technical** Airspace Regulator (Technical) stated that an RMZ/TMZ was deemed to provide a "known traffic environment" and stated that TCAS RAs were predominantly fail-safe events. The Airspace Regulator highlighted that this approach, proposed by Oxford, to use TCAS data might need to be reviewed. TCAS data would not capture the issue described by Oxford in the presentation. For instance, non-transponding traffic would not be included in these statistics, an example would be an AIRPROX with a Hawker 800 with a glider in March 2022 which was more about a lack of knowledge about the glider’s location as it was not communicating with ATC nor was it displaying on radar rather than a controller workload issue. Oxford’s view was that whilst traffic within an RMZ was “known”, a separate TMZ was not as the aircraft’s intentions were unknown; hence, the combination of a RMZ/TMZ did not provide the encompassing known environment. Oxford would not be solely relying on TCAS RAs as these only cover transponding aircraft; evidence would be supplied of aircraft operating close the final approach tracks not transponding Mode A/C/S or not showing on radar as they were flying below the target threshold speed for the radar (e.g .gliders in thermals or travelling at a slow velocity). For the incident referred to, AIRPROX REPORT No 2022030 on 14/03/2022 involved a Hawker 800 and an ASG29 glider which had not been reported to the controller as an AIRPROX on the day of the incident. There were several intermittent contacts that appear for one or two sweeps of the radar and then faded but this was common on most digital radars; if every such return had to be avoided the operation would not be possible. Oxford agrees that this incident was not workload related, it was due to the glider not showing on radar (or on ADS-B that it had been fitted for) and not communicating with ATC. Oxford believed that had there been a known traffic environment, or the pilot had communicated with ATC that this incident would not have occurred. Inspector ATS (Operations) stated that the non-visibility of gliders on the final approach was a known issue and for safety; the airspace needed to have everyone playing their part as this would increase the level of safety. It was acknowledged that certain groups would object to proposals at Engagement. Towards the end of the process, the Unit would need to address how controllers would be trained on the new procedures and/or airspace. As the ACP progressed, at some point this might require a simulator. The Oxford Accountable Manager highlighted that any resource for commercial operations would have to go through a business case to justify the cost of airspace to contain the operation against the resource that new business could potentially generate. This would form part of the ACP. **Engagement & Consultation** The Airspace Regulator (Engagement & Consultation) highlighted that Oxford should consider the development of an engagement strategy to detail how stakeholder engagement would be managed throughout the change process. Although the approval of the strategy was not required by the CAA in advance of Stage 1, effective engagement was an important requirement.	

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CAP1616 Paragraph 121 gave the engagement expected at Step 1B which would be with: - directly affected local aviation stakeholders, including airspace users, air navigation service providers and airports. - relevant members of the National Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee. - relevant aviation/non-aviation national organisations, including those which represent areas/interests likely to be affected by potential impacts. - elected representatives and/or environmental interest groups representing communities likely to be affected by potential impacts (such as noise or economic growth) associated with the change. For Design Principles, Appendix D Paragraph D8 listed the outputs required from the activity including the list of stakeholders and how they were identified, engagement methodology, chronology, explanation of issues raised, how feedback has influenced the Design Principles and evidence of two-way conversations. With the new version of CAP1616 coming into effect from January 2024, sponsors would now be required to share the current day scenario in Stage 1 at the same time as when engaging on the Design Principles. Additionally, all impacted stakeholders needed to be identified and it would be essential to track and maintain all correspondence; the retention of evidence, including activity logs, was essential to back up that the process had been followed. In Stage 3, it was essential to target the right audience and to provide the tools to enable stakeholders to make informed decisions. If the sponsor believes that they could conduct a consultation that was open, fair, transparent, and effective within a period that was less than the recognised 12-week standard, then a rationale must be given in the consultation strategy ahead of the Consult Gateway. It was lastly noted that CitizenSpace must be used. [redacted] highlighted that the NATMAC response rate was poor and asked whether the CAA could do anything to improve the response rates. Sponsor should provide evidence that they have circulated all relevant information to stakeholders. The CAA would look at methods used by the sponsor to maximize responses such as the issue of reminder notices. [redacted] escalated concerns to the CAA NATMAC Secretary. **Environmental** The Airspace Regulator (Environment) explained the process requirement from the Environmental standpoint. In respect of the Assessment Meeting presentation, slide 6 'Opportunities arising from proposed change' includes a statement "Reduce noise impact by London Oxford Airport (LOA) traffic on some of the local population". [redacted] suggested that this statement would benefit from being made clearer as it could be interpreted that whilst noise impacts could be reduced for some of the local population, others might not benefit. Paragraph 98 of CAP1616 v.4 states in respect of the Statement of Need that "the change sponsor must be explicit in what issue or opportunity it was seeking to address and what outcome it wished to achieve". Under the new CAP1616 process, the key process changes would include the need to provide a 'current day' baseline scenario at Stage 1. Impacts on biodiversity would be considered as part of the Stage 5 assessment but would need to be considered from an early stage; the new CAP1616 process has a screening checklist to identify whether a Habitats Regulations Assessment (HRA) would be required in respect of European protected sites specifically SAC, SPA & RAMSAR sites. Protected sites could be identified by reference to DEFRA's mapping repository Magic Maps. [redacted] highlighted the significant cost of Biodiversity studies. [redacted] suggested that the HRA checklist in the revised CAP1616 should be helpful to the sponsor in enabling them to scope the requirement for further HRA assessment. [redacted] highlighted that the new CAP1616 Stage 1 Mandatory and Discretionary Design Principles would not be available until end of November 2023, and this could impact some work. **Economic** [redacted] stated that there were no changes in the new CAP1616. Qualitative discussions at Stage 1 should progress through Stage 2 and by Stage 3/4 should include quantitative and	

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monetised assessment of the impacts. He noted that the new CAP1616 process would require the baseline to be set again. **Provisional indication of the scale level** [redacted] stated that the CAA was content to assign a provisional Level 1 to the LOA ACP. **** When the sponsor submits their gateway materials for each Gateway at the agreed submission deadline, the period between this and the gateway decision will be an analysis by the CAA Airspace Regulatory team (Airspace Regulation) of the documentation submitted, for the purposes of making a recommendation to the CAA Gateway decision maker(s). In conducting the gateway assessment, the CAA is assessing the process employed and its compliance with the guidance stipulated within CAP 1616. It is not an assessment of the merits of the submission itself, which is reviewed at Stage 5 - Decision. We may request documentation from the sponsor that is referred to in the gateway submission but has not been provided as part of the Gateway submission materials. We may also request the sponsor to provide information by way of clarification relating to statements or assumptions made in the submission. Any further information sought by Airspace Regulation at this stage is for clarificatory purposes and is only for determining compliance with the CAP 1616 process.*** ***In any instance where a sponsor has not met the requirements of the process, we will inform them after the gateway decision and advise of next steps.*** ***Please note that this text does not apply to airspace change proposals involving the sole implementation of RNP Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) without an Approach Control, as Gateway Assessments are not required. Therefore, this text can be removed from the Assessment Meeting minutes.***	
Item 6 – Provisional process timescales* [redacted] discussed Gateways and the fact that March 2024 was already heavily scheduled with work and with the new CAP1616 guidance not yet released, timelines could be tight. As LOA had specified this month for the Define Gateway, [redacted] encouraged the sponsor to submit timescales as soon as possible so capacity could be booked or potentially expect a delay. The provisional process timelines, see Slide 17 of the presentation, were given as: • Stage 1 Define Gateway - 22 March 2024 • Stage 2 Develop & Assess Gateway - 26 July 2024 • Stage 3 Consult Gateway - 29 November 2024 • Formal ACP Submission - 27 June 2025 • Stage 5 (CAA Decide Gateway) i.e. when the Sponsor requires a decision - 30 January 2026 • Target AIRAC (with AIS sponsor submission cut off) - 2026/06 Effective 11 June 2026 **** The timeline agreed may become subject to change by the CAA. This is because the Secretary of State for Transport has directed the CAA to prioritise RNP Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) without an Approach Control proposals; this may impact Airspace Regulation resource and consequently timelines.***	[redacted] to review timeline
Item 7 – Next steps [redacted] requested sight of the draft minutes by Friday 10/11/23 and suggested that LOA standby for the new version of CAP1616 which would come into force in January 2024 along with guidance material. The agreed redacted Minutes were to be published onto the Airspace Portal by 17 November 2023.	[redacted] to publish redacted minutes
Item 8 – Any other business **AMS Discussion** **AMS Parts 1, and 2** [redacted] believed that the plan for the introduction of ICAO FIS (as articulated in AMS Parts 1 and 2) reduced the safety mitigation currently used in uncontrolled airspace (Class G), by	

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removing the ability of London Oxford Airport's ATC radar controllers to vector and sequence IFR and VFR traffic as could be achieved under a TS or DS. **Intended Replacement of UK FIS with ICAO FIS** UK FIS DS and TS provides the necessary Safety mitigation to operate IFR in Class G by enabling the vectoring and sequencing of IFR departures and arrivals, the integration of IFR and VFR, and the deconfliction from known v unknown and provision of traffic information on known v unknown aircraft. ICAO FIS does not allow vectoring without the prior agreement of the pilot which in the event of a busy IFR period was impractical as aircraft must be sequenced to enable a safe and efficient departure and arrival. If one aircraft insists on self-positioning or does not take a heading or altitude, the arrival pattern and required landing separation sequence could be compromised. Oxford was aware that the CAA believed that the ICAO FIS 'advice' within Class G meant that headings and levels could be provided to pilots; however, [redacted] was not sure that this was what ICAO intended as ICAO does not define radar services in Class G with detail on what 'advice' and 'Information' meant or what could be provided. The CAA statement that ICAO 'advice' within ICAO FIS could apply to the provision of headings and/or levels was not accepted as being equivalent to the current provision of and responsibilities of an ATCO and Pilot when undertaking a DS or TS. What if the pilot did not follow the advice? Those who have operated in the Oxford AIAA – busy airspace – would be aware that when you were sequencing IFR (or mixed with VFR) aircraft arriving and/or departing, a pilot not following 'advice' could mean the difference between a safe situation and an incident. It was not known how the CAA would mitigate an AOC Holder whose mitigation to operate in Class G was a DS, i.e. the AOC holder needs 'deconfliction' to be provided (e.g. KLM)? In this case, the CAA's interpretation of the ICAO FIS 'advice' would be insufficient. Consequently, there might be a requirement for 'suitable airspace' at the implementation of the AMS to allow continued vectoring and sequencing of traffic where mitigation could not be provided to maintain the current level of safety. It might be that to replace the reduction in safety caused by the mandated change to ICAO FIS in Class G and to ensure continued safe operation, suitable airspace would be required. In addition, some form of CAS might be required for CAT to align with ICAO and to meet the AMS. **Intended Replacement of ATZ with potentially an RMZ** An ATZ provides some level of safety protecting aircraft at critical stages of flight. An RMZ does not stop a pilot from entering where the intention has been imparted to ATC; a Global or larger Business Jet on a stabilised approach would have to be broken off to assure safety which also means a longer period within the Class G environment and increased environmental output. **AMS Part 3** It was understood that the CAA plans to hold a series of Workshops in 2024 to discuss AMS Part 3 which might clarify Class G options. Hopefully, AMS Part 3 would provide the 'how' the current safety levels could be maintained with appropriate mitigation. **Summary of the AMS Discussion** The impact of AMS was discussed, particularly the replacement of UK FIS with ICAO FIS which [redacted] considered was a reduction in the level of safety owing to being unable to vector and sequence in Class G as the Unit does today and the replacement of the ATZ with an RMZ over which the ATC Unit had no control over who could enter as long as they were communicating and stating what they were intending to do unlike an ATZ where the ATC Unit could prevent access to assure safety. [redacted] had commented on these issues at all consultations of the AMS and had separately directly communicated with [redacted], CAA. The CAA's view was that ICAO FIS enabled the provision of 'advice' and that this enabled ANSP's to provide headings and levels to	

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aircraft. [redacted] had stated that neither Annex 11 nor ICAO DOC 4444 gave any indication of the ability to provide radar services including vectoring and sequencing and stated that a pilot was to be asked if vectors could be applied which was not feasible in the traffic levels at Oxford. Oxford stated that it was hoped that the CAA would provide mitigations within AMS Part 3 to enable the current level of safety to be maintained to ensure no reduction of safety.	

ACTIONS ARISING FROM LONDON OXFORD AIRPORT - INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES - RWY01 AND RWY19 (ACP-2023-033) ASSESSMENT MEETING

Subject	Name	Action	Deadline
Meeting Minutes	[redacted]	Sponsor to write up minutes of the meeting and once approved upload redacted version to Airspace portal with PowerPoint presentation.	Draft 10/11/2023
SON	[redacted]	Issue SON V4 to CAA and upload a redacted version to the Airspace Portal.	17/11/2023
Review Timeline	[redacted]	Review the proposed process timelines as March 2024 was already at capacity and plan to allow a minimum one-week buffer between Stages and submission to AIS.	10/11/2023

[redacted]

ACP Sponsor